

Genus is Taken from Matter, Difference from Form

To determine further the relation of genus and difference to the parts of the thing, it is necessary to note that the parts of the definition can be said to signify the parts of the thing only in so far as the parts of the definition are taken from the parts of the thing. The concepts of genus and difference can be traced to certain parts and causes of the thing but they are not these parts. Genus is reduced to matter; diversity of genus comes from diversity of matter. Species is reduced to form and a diversity in the ultimate determination of form accounts for the diversity of difference. Genus has a certain proportion to matter as species has to form but neither signifies as such matter or form. Species likewise is in a certain proportion to the composite of matter and form, but it does not signify this composite as such but rather the union of genus and difference (aliquid complectens genus et differentiam). The proportionality of genus and difference to matter and form is succinctly explained by Cajetan in the following lines:

Si enim perfectio generica, quae formaliter importatur per genus, est materialis respectu perfectionis differentialis, quae formaliter importatur per differentiam, oportet quod sicut se habet materia respectu formae in composito naturali, puta Sorte, ita genus respectu differentiae in composito rationali, scilicet specie, ut sicut materia est potentialis et perficitur ac specificatur per formam, sic generica perfectio est potentialis perfectibilis et specificabilis per differentiam.²⁹

Matter is the root of potentiality and determinability in the thing; form, the principle of act and determination. Genus and difference, differing proportionately as the indeterminate and the determinate and signifying in each case the essence, are most like the essential principles of matter and form. Genus is, therefore, taken from matter as from the proper principle of potentiality in the thing; difference is taken proportionately from the form, the principle of determination.

To show more clearly that genus and difference cannot signify matter and form respectively we should note again that genus and difference signify the whole. Since neither matter nor form are wholes, it follows that genus and difference do not signify them as such. The species likewise does not signify the composite of matter and form as such since its parts are properly the genus and difference. Cajetan gives St. Thomas's proof of this point in syllogistic form:

Materia et forma sunt partes sui totius, sicut duae res tertiae rei; genus et differentia non sunt partes sui totius, scilicet speciei, ut duae res tertiae rei: ergo genus et differentia non sunt materia et forma speciei. Major patet ex se: homo enim est alia res a materia sua, et alia a sua forma. . . . Minor vero declaratur hoc modo: si genus et differentia componerent speciem, ut duae res tertiam, tunc homo esset compositus ex animali et rationali; hoc est falsum: ergo a destructione consequentis genus et differentia non component speciem, ut duae res tertiam, quod erat probandum.³⁰

In giving an example to explain the above point, St. Thomas goes on to say that man is composed of rational and of

animal sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus.

The concept of the species or of the definition is composed of two concepts, the genus and the difference. And so, because the definition is constituted by several parts, we cannot say that it is the genus or the difference. But how is this composition to be understood? Should it be taken as a composition of concepts in the order of second intentions or of first intentions, a composition of that which is formally signified by the terms or of the thing itself? There can be no argument about the first case: the second intention of definition or of species, as a logical relation, cannot be composed of the second intentions of genus and difference, just as no relation is composed of other relations. The

second intention of definition is a relation imposed by the mind on a definite concept formed in the first operation of the mind and explaining distinctly the genus and difference.

Nor is there any question of the things signified by the generic, specific, or differential names of the first intention; there is no composition here since the things signified are

the same in re for each of the terms. The composition can

only exist in the line of the formal concepts (in the sense of the formale significatum) of these names. It cannot be

a composition of concepts as qualities inhering in the mind since as such all of them are simple qualities, not composed

of parts. The composition is only according to that which

is formally represented in each concept, a composition of the objective concepts as such. In this sense we can speak of a ³¹ third concept composed of two other concepts.

Although genus and difference do not signify matter and form they are, nonetheless, taken from them. How is the genus, first of all, taken from matter? Evidently it cannot be taken simply from the pure potentiality of prime matter since a genus signifies a certain nature, a definite actuality although not fully determined. Pure potentiality cannot as such be a principle of our knowledge. Genus must therefore be taken from matter according as matter is in some way intelligible to us. Matter is knowable in two ways; (a) by analogy or comparison with the relation existing in artificial things between the artificial form and what is material in respect to it; (b) by the form through which it is in act, for everything is known only in so far as it is in act. As matter is known in this way through form it affords a twofold basis for generic diversity.

(a) Matter is first the source of a diversity of genera as it stands in diverse proportion to form. From this diverse relation to form we have the diversity of the first genera of things. This is the basis in reality of the diverse predication of the categories. That which is in the genus of substance is compared to matter as to its part. That which is in the genus of quantity is compared to matter not as to its part but as the measure of it; quality as its disposition; and through these two the other categories are compared to matter

according to their respective proportions. Since matter is a part of substance, substance becomes a subject to these accidents.

(b) Matter is also the principle of diverse genera within a first genus. Within the genus of substance matter is the principle of genus according to the diverse degrees in which matter may be perfected by forms. Matter receives the perfection of act to different degrees in different things. Since the more perfect things possess in a certain way the perfections of the less perfect, something common can be found in various things which can be predicated univocally of all but which will be found more perfectly in one, less perfectly in the other. Matter as actuated in this way to a certain level of perfection common to many forms will be the basis of genus. Beyond this level specific forms will differ as having or not having further perfections. Matter actuated to the level of a common sensitive nature can thus be the basis of the genus "animal," which genus is still material and in potency to a further perfection, "rational," or the imperfection, "non-rational," its privative contrary. Since such a common degree of actuation may be found at various levels, (e.g., corporeal nature and sensitive nature), there will be a diversity of genus drawn from matter according as matter is actuated to diverse common levels. The genera of body, plant, and animal differ in this way.³²

Form is the principle of diversity according to species since it is by reason of formal qualities which material things possess in addition to those which are the cause of their genus, that the differences constituting species are derived. The difference is derived from the perfection or imperfection super-added to the common material element of the genus. Thus "sensible" and "insensible" are as differentiae added to the genus "animate."

We can conclude, then, that in things composed of matter and form, all the grades (or levels) of being are taken from the form, since the matter as such does not of itself determine a grade but receives and is informed by one. Matter is, nonetheless, remotely the principle of genus in such beings inasmuch as it is the principle of all potentiality. It is proximately the principle of genus only in so far as it is informed by form to a degree of being which is imperfect and material with respect to specific being.⁵³

Physical Genus and Logical Genus

The question of the relation of genus to matter has further implications of essential importance in distinguishing the way in which the logician and the natural philosopher define. Although the material element from which the genus is taken in composite things has both matter and form, the logician will consider only the formal element. Of interest to him

is only the common formality which is as such further determinable. It is this which pertains per se to genus in itself and not to genus as found in this or that nature. The logical intention of genus is constituted by this relation of universality with regard to inferiors differing in species.³⁴ The intention of genus can be found in various natures. Some of these are composed of matter and form; some are purely forms although dependent on matter, like accidents; others are pure subsistent forms. Since the logician considers the intentions absolutely, he may place in one genus things which will differ in genus as far as the natural philosopher is concerned. Only the logician can put material and immaterial created substances in the one genus, substance; or corruptible and incorruptible material substances in one genus--body. The definitions of the logician will thus be called formal.

The natural philosopher and the metaphysician, who consider the essences of things precisely as they have existence in things, must consider all the principles of the thing--both form and matter. The naturalis or physicus must look beyond a common ratio for a common matter in order to place things in one genus. Where this community of matter is not found there will necessarily be a diverse mode of potency and act. Where the latter is diverse the mode of being will likewise be diverse and consequently also the genera. Corruptibility in things springs from the matter. If there exist material substances which are incorruptible, this will pertain

necessarily to them and will imply necessarily a different kind of matter, a different kind of potency, and therefore also of physical genus. It is evident that material and immaterial created substances do not have a common matter.

For the natural philosopher genus is properly taken from matter. Genus, physice loquendo, sumitur a materia. For the logician the genus is taken from what is material (potential) but not properly from the matter. For the naturalis the sentence, genus sumitur a materia, implies above all a common matter.³⁵ This matter is not itself the genus. We shall still designate as genus "corruptible body, plant, etc." but with this further factor that the nature on which they are based implies a common matter. Only then can we speak of a physical genus.

St. Thomas also remarks that naturaliter loquendo the differences dividing the species must be opposed as contraries. For the logician, on the other hand, any kind of opposition of differences suffices, as is evident in the case of the species of number and of separate substances. Natural differentiae must be contraries since matter on which genus is founded is in potency to contrary forms. Substantial forms will be contraries only in the broad^{sense}/of a contrariety of privation. Matter actuated by one substantial form is opposed to all other substantial forms and is in privation of them.³⁶ Because of this privation of all other substantial

forms, a privation that implies a basic potency to receive them, we can speak of a generatio ad invicem which, understood in a broad sense, follows here on the community of matter.³⁷ We shall not extend the present study to the question of the relation of physical genus to the genus subjectum of accidents, a point which demands a lengthy discussion of the above two questions--those of contrariety and of generatio ad invicem.

The Definability of Separate Substances

The question of the relation of the parts of the definition to the parts of the thing defined takes on a new aspect in the case of the definition of a separate substance. Since a separate substance is a simple form, implying no composition of matter and form, there is no composition in the essence itself from which genus and difference can be taken. To what do genus and difference correspond in the separate substance; from what are they taken? It will be necessary for us to establish first whether these substances are definable before determining how they are definable.

Wherever the quiddity of anything is not the same as its existence (esse), that thing can be ordered within the categories. Where the existence of a thing is not its essence this existence must necessarily be limited, and limi-

ted to existence in some genus. To have an existence not limited to any genus is to have an unlimited existence--to be per se subsistens. It is clear that separate substances have a quiddity which is distinct from their esse. Because of this, each of them must have genus, species, and difference, although their proper differentiae remain unknown to us. We know the fact that they have differentiae even though what they are remains hidden to us. In the case of sensible substances, the essential differences as such are unknown to us, but they are signified by accidental differences which arise from the essential ones. Through the effect we know the cause. But even the proper accidents of separate substances are unknown to us so that we cannot signify their differentiae of themselves or through accidental differentiae. Although only the species is that which is properly defined it is not necessary that every species be definable by us. The species of immaterial substances are known to us not by definition but only, as St. Thomas notes, per quasdam negationes vel notificationes.³⁸

Genus and difference are, however, taken in a different way in sensible substances and in immaterial substances. Since immaterial substances are pure forms, uncomposed, both genus and difference must be taken in them from the whole essence not only formally but also radically. Each, however, is taken from the whole essence in a different way. The genus

is taken from the whole essence according as by it one separate substance is essentially like another. The difference is taken from the whole essence in so far as by it one differs substantially from another. They differ in this way by a certain formal degree of perfection by which one intellect is more perfect than another according as it approaches closer to the pure act of the divine perfection. In this way what pertains per se to genus and difference is preserved also in separate substances--that genus signify a certain nature formally as determinable and that the difference express the determinate substantial perfection of this being. What is per accidens is not found--that they be taken properly from matter and form.³⁹ The latter is proper to genus and difference as found in composed substances.

All simple substances will be contained in one genus, which will be one of immateriality, intellectuality or the like in which all agree. Since their perfection is not taken from a series of differences perfecting a genus, these substances have no subalternate genus.⁴⁰ The differences which distinguish them will follow on their having a greater or lesser perfection as compared to the primum agens, quod oportet esse perfectissimum, and not as compared to matter, since they do not have matter. Only in sensible substances because of the progressive perfectibility of a common prime matter can we have a series of genera and differences, of grades of perfection, based on diverse natures where one nature is determinable

by another nature more perfect than itself.⁴¹

The Composite Nature of Things as Reflected
in Our Way of Knowing

If we stop now to consider the whole structure of our mode of knowledge in the first operation of the mind, a process which terminates in the knowledge of essences through genus and specific difference, there becomes evident a remarkable correspondence of it to the composite nature of the things known. Our way of knowing through genera and differences follows necessarily on the kind of intellect which man has and is proportioned to the composite nature of the proper object of the human intellect--the quiddity of sensible substances. A parallel can be drawn between the way in which prime matter is potency to an infinity of substantial forms, by which it can be actuated only successively and gradually, and the way the human intellect is in potency to the knowledge of all things and is moved from potency to act by the intelligible forms of things. The intellect cannot know all by one form but must be actuated gradually by a succession of forms. This analogy of intellectual knowledge to natural generation can be developed at much greater length.

A point of particular interest in the study of our way of knowing by definition is the fact that the intellect be-

cause of its potency must be actuated gradually in the first operation of the mind. This process starts with the most universal and imperfect concepts and works down to a more and more determinate knowledge of the specific natures. The first form by which it is actuated is being, the primum cognitum, which must be known in a certain concretion to material being. Having no species contained under it, this notion is not generic, nor is it analogous. It is simply a univocal concept. From this we descend through the higher genera till we attain the natures in their specific differences. Such knowledge is proportioned to the composite nature of the proper object of the mind (not the adequate object which is being). Since the genus is taken from matter and the difference from the form, the definition represents the composite character of the sensible quiddity.

The fact that we must know sensible, material quiddities in this way follows from the very fact that our intellect is the faculty of a soul which is received in matter. Its participation in the divine lumen is so imperfect as to make it dependent on the things in nature in the generation of its knowledge. It depends ultimately on the material singular for its actuation. Because of this imperfection, it does not possess the universals in representando of angelic knowledge, whereby several things can be known at once in their distinction as in their cause. In order to know several things at

once the human intellect must resort to a universal which is a potential whole. We depend on things as they exist in their material individuality for our knowledge. We must abstract from them with the help of the agent intellect to a universal which contains its inferiors only in potency.

Although the process of knowing by genus and difference is in this way most proportioned to our knowledge of composite, material quiddities, we must carry it over likewise to any knowledge of immaterial quiddities, simple forms, which would more properly be known by intuition because of their simplicity. This way of knowing by which we must start from that which is most general is observed likewise in the order of determination in all our speculative sciences.

There remain several other important questions considered by Aristotle in the latter part of the tenth and in the eleventh chapter of the seventh book which we shall have to omit in this brief study because of the lengthy treatment which they demand. The first of these is the question of what matter is part of the species and thus enters the definition. This problem demands a study of the distinction of individual matter and common matter both in natural substances and in mathematica, for only common matter enters a definition. It should likewise be explained how the ratio of anything must be taken principally from the form, and that only those parts

of matter are included in which the form is principally found. The latter point brings us already to another complex question, that of the priority, simultaneity, and posteriority of parts to the species. A full explanation of the diversity of parts should accompany this question, e.g., the distinction of the parts of the species secundum rationem and secundum rem.⁴²

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITY OF THE DEFINITION

We shall go on immediately to a question which Aristotle considers in the twelfth chapter--the unity of the definition. The question comes up likewise in the sixth chapter of the eighth book. How can the definition which consists of many parts be one; how can it signify that which is one, the quod quid est? The objection which he raises is directed against the unity of the composite of genus and difference. For genus and difference to be one, it would seem that the genus would have to participate in differences which are contraries; but this seems impossible. Moreover, if several differences are used in the same definition, how can they constitute one ratio?

In answering these questions Aristotle limits the discussion to true definitions and to the definition of substance, which is of importance here. Such definitions are given through the division of a genus by true differences. They can always be resolved into a first genus and some differences. If any intermediate genus is used in defining, it is such as to embrace the first genus and the differences which constitute the subalternate genus. Thus if "animal" is used as the mediate genus of man, it is equivalent to "substance" together

with the differences "animate" and "sensible." In any definition there may be more but there must be at least two members, a genus and a difference.⁴³

The definition has its unity, by which it is one ratio signifying one nature or essence, precisely from its difference. The whole essence of the definition is somehow comprehended in the difference. The genus cannot be apart from its species since the forms of the species, which are the differences, are not other forms than that of the genus, but are the forms of the genus with their determinations. Animal is found only as man, horse, oow, etc. The difference is not added to the genus as a diverse essence but as implicitly contained in the genus, as determinate in the indeterminate, as "white" in "colored."⁴⁴

The division must proceed by proper and per se differences to the ultimate difference. If the differences are all taken per se and not per accidens, then the whole substance of the thing and the whole definition is constituted by the ultimate difference. The ultimate difference includes in itself all the preceding parts of the definition. It includes the genus since the genus cannot be without the species. If it did not include the preceding differences there would be needless repetition (nugatio) in definition. Thus "two-footed," which constitutes the difference of man as an integral whole, contains "having-feet."⁴⁵

If, however, the differences are only accidental, then one difference will not contain the others. There will be as many ultimate differences as there are divisions. They will be one only in subjecto, which does not suffice for the unity of the definition. The arguments against the unity of the definition are based on such differentiae.

The ultimate reason that genus and difference are united to constitute one ratio is, then, that one part is as matter, the other as form. Just as form comes to matter so as to constitute a true unity, so difference comes to genus. The mere material joining of several terms without interruption is in no way sufficient.⁴⁶

The manner in which difference is added to genus will explain likewise the common dictum: definitio explicat definitum a prima potentia usque ad ultimum actum. Any individual whose essence is distinct from its existence can have several essential predicates which approach more or less closely to the existence of this thing. The first genus is a predicate whereby this essence is most potential and most removed from its existence. The difference is taken, however, from the whole essence according as it is closest to its proper being. It constitutes the species in its degree of being and thus gives to the essence its ultimate intrinsic complement so that it can receive the being of actual existence. The genus explains the essence as most determinable and removed

from existence; the ultimate difference explains it as perfected by the ultimate act determining it so that it may receive existence. Intermediate differences are taken from intermediate perfections. In this way the definition explains the essence from its first potency to the ultimate act which determines it in order to the being of actual existence. Genus and difference abstract from actual existence, but they look to it as a foundation receptive of being--the former a remote foundation, the latter a proximate one.⁴⁷

Because of this relation to the esse existentiae we can see why genus and difference can be found in separate substances, material substances, and accidents. Only God lacks genus and difference. Since His quiddity is His actual existence, it cannot be conceived as more remote or more proximate to this existence. God is not in a genus because He is His esse.⁴⁸

A question which might be raised is why ens and the other transcendentals together with negative predicates do not enter definitions. All quidditative predicates enter the nature considered in itself and should, therefore, be contained in a complete definition of this nature. But transcendental and negative predicates also seem to be quidditative predicates. Why are they not required for the completion of the definition?

The principle that a definition is complete when it explains all the grades of being of a thing from its first potency to the ultimate intrinsic act can be applied here in resolving this question. If a definition must explain only all the essential grades of being in a thing, it must include only those essential predicates which express these grades. Transcendental predicates, however, do not express any grade or nature other than the generic or specific nature to which they are applied. They do not alter the nature as such. They merely express this nature in diverse modes: as one, true, good, etc. They are not proper to any given nature absolutely considered, but are common to nature considered in any way: in the mind, in individuals, or absolutely. They are substantial predicates but not in the same way as the predicates which enter the definition. Ens and unum are not related to the categories as genera since this would imply a relation of matter to differences which would determine them. Such a relation is impossible because ens and unum are immediately each of the categories and not by any addition.

Negatives predicates, considered formally, are likewise excluded from the nature absolutely considered and from the definition. If we consider these predicates formally, they are attributed to the nature only by the intellect for negations are only beings of reason. Considered fundamentally according as negation is based on affirmation, they are nothing but the affirmative predicates and can thus be considered essential predicates.⁴⁹

FOOTNOTES

PART I:

1. S. Albertus Magnus, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, Vol. I, (Paris: Vivès, 1890), De Praedicabilibus, p. 8.
2. Cf. ibid., p. 9: "Complexio autem et incomplexio non accidunt rei secundum quod res est, nec etiam voci secundum quod est vox: sed accidunt voci secundum quod refertur ad intellectum simplicem vel compositum. Simplicem autem dico intellectum, qui simplex unius rei est intuitivus. Talis enim intellectus non significatur ad alium, nisi voce sive dictione incomplexa. Compositum autem dico intellectum, qui accipit rem unam in alia vel ut divisam ab alia: qui intellectus voce incomplexa designari non potest, sed potius complexa.²
3. Ibid., p. 8.
4. S. Thomas Aquinatis, Commentarium in Aristotelis Libros Perihermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum, in Opera Omnia S. Thomae, editio Leonina, (Rome: Polyglot Press, 1882), Vol. I, (In I Post. Anal., lect. 22, n. 12.
5. S. Thomas Aquinatis, (In Metaphysicam) Aristotelis Commentaria, ed. Cathala, (Turin: Marietti; 1926), (Lib. IV, lect. 16, n. 733).
6. S. Thomas Aquinatis, (In Aristotelis Librum de Anima) Commentaria, ed. Pirota, (Turin: Marietti, 1936), (Lib. I, lect. 1, n. 9.)
7. Manlius Severini Boetius, Liber de Diffinitione, in Patrolologiae Cursus Completus, Series Prima, edited by Migne, (Paris, 1847), Tome 64, col. 891.
8. Aristotle, Metaphysics, in Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, (New York: Random House, 1941), Bk. XIII, chap. 4. Cf. also Aristotle, ibid., Bk. I, chap. 6.
9. Opera Omnia, Vol. I, De Praedicabilibus, p. 8.
10. (S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones Disputatae, (5 vols.; Turin: Marietti, 1942), Vol. II, Q.D. De Anima, a. 18, corp: "Unde considerandum est, quod eo modo quo aliquid est de perfectione naturae, eo modo ad perfectionem intelligibilem pertinet; singularia namque non sunt de perfectione naturae propter se, sed propter aliud; scilicet ut in eis salventur species quas natura intendit. Natura enim intendit generare hominem, non hunc hominem; nisi in quantum homo non potest esse nisi sit hic homo . . . quasi solum id quod est in specie, sit de intentione naturae, unde cognoscere species rerum pertinet ad perfectionem intelligibilem; non autem cognitio individuorum nisi forte per accidens."

11. Ibid., Vol. III, Q.D. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1; Summa Theologiae, in Opera Omnia, ed. Leonina, Vols. IV-XII, Pars Ia-IIa, (Vol. VII), q. 90, a. 1, ad 2; Contra Gentiles, in Opera Omnia, ed. Leonina, Vols. XIII-XV, Lib. I, (Vol. XIII), cap. 14.
12. Vol. I, I. Perihermenias, p. 373.
13. Ibid., De Sex. Principiis, p. 305.
14. Ibid., De Praedicamentis, p. 149.
15. Ibid., p. 15; also p. 14, col. 2.
16. Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, In Praedicamenta Aristotelis, ed. Laurent, (Rome: Institutum Angelicum, 1939), Prologus, p. 3.
17. Joannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus Philosophicus, ed. Reiser, (Turin: Marietti, 1930-37), Vol. I, p. 380.
18. Ibid., p. 503.
19. S. Albertus, Vol. I, De Praedicabilibus, p. 15.
20. Cajetanus, In Praedicamentorum, p. 3.
21. P.L., T. 64, cols. 891-910.
22. Introduction à Avicenne; Son Epître des Définitions, edited with introduction by A.M. Goichon, (Paris: Desclée, 1933).
23. I, pp. 11-14.
24. Robert Lincoln, Commentaria in Libros Posteriorum Aristotelis, (Venice: Petrus de quarengilis de Pergamo, 1504), In II Post. Anal., p. 29. Cf. also S. Thomas Aquinatis, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, T. I-II, ed. Mandonnet, (Paris: Lethiellieux, 1929), In I Sent., disp. 2, q. 1, a. 3.
25. S. Thomas In V Metaph., lect. 19, n. 1048; In I Peri., lect. 4, n. 2.
26. In Post. Anal., Lib. II, p. 29.
27. Aristoteles, Topica, in Opera Omnia, ed. Bekker, (Berlin, 1831-1870), 101 b38.
28. Liber de Diffinitione, P.L., T. 64, col. 891.
29. In VI Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 1232, 1236; In I Peri., lect. 8 n. 6; ibid., lect. 6, nn. 2-3.

30. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, pp. 372-73; Cursus Theologicus, in Iam, disp. 22, a. 4, nn. 27-29, ed. Vivès, (10 vols.; Paris, 1884-85), IV, p. 862; in IIIam, disp. 14, a. 2, nn. 26-29, VIII (Vivès), p. 406.
31. Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 134.
32. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 137.
33. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 138.
34. In I Peri., lect. 8, n. 8.
35. In II Post. Anal., lect. 2, n. 11; cf. also In I Post. Anal., lect. 19, n. 5.
36. Cf. In I Post. Anal., lect. 5, n. 9; ibid., lect. 19, n. 7.
37. Cf. In VI Metaph., lect. 4, n. 1236.
38. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thoma, Cursus Phil., I, p. 135. S. Thomas Ia, q. 17, a. 3; De Ver., q. 1, a. 3; In VI Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 1237-38.
39. Ia, q. 58, a. 5, corp; cf. also In III De Anima, lect. 11, nn. 762-63; Ia, q. 85, a. 6, corp.; In IX Metaph., lect. 11, nn. 1901-9.
40. In I Peri., lect. 4, n. 2.
41. Cf. S. Thomas Aquinatis, In VIII Libros Phisicorum Aristoteles, in Opera Omnia, editio Leonina, Vol. II, In IV Physic., lect. 5, n. 3; In I De Anima, lect. 11, S. Albertus, Vol. I, De Praedicationibus, p. 11-14. Avicenna, in Goichon, Introduction à Avicenne, pp. 7 ff.
42. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 450.
43. Liber de Diffinitione, P.L., T. 64, col. 895.
44. Goichon, Introduction à Avicenne, p. 22: "Comme le dit le Sage (Aristote) dans le livre des Topiques, c'est un énoncé qui indique la quiddité de la chose, c'est-à-dire la perfection de son être essentiel. Elle s'obtient du genre prochain et de la différence spécifique.' Hadd, n'est donc appliqué au sens tout à fait propre qu'à la définition essentielle métaphysique. Avicenne énumère cinq sens impropres du mot hadd,: 1. La définition nominale, 'qui expose le sens d'un nom indépendamment de l'être de la chose.' Puis concernant l'essence sans toute-

fois donner la quiddité: 2. La conclusion du syllogisme, 3. Le 'principe du syllogisme'; 4. Le hadd complet formé en les réunissant; 5. 'La définition des choses qui n'ont ni causes ni motifs, ou bien dont les motifs et les causes ne pénètrent pas l'essence, comme la définition du point de l'unité, de la définition et de tout ce qui ressemble à cela.'"

45. Vol. I, De Praedicabilibus, p. 14.

46. Ibid.

47. Curs. Phil., I, p. 20.

48. Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica Posteriora, ed. Bekker, (Berlin 1831-1870), Lib. II, cap. 7, 92 b25-35; ibid., cap. 9, 93 b28; De Anima, ed. Bekker, Lib. I, cap. 1, 402 b17 f. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 6; ibid., lect. 8, n. 6; In I De Anima, lect. 1, n. 15.

49. Curs. Phil., I, p. 19. Cf. also S. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 35, q. 12, a. 2, ad 2. Cajetanus, In Iam, q. 13, a. 6, n. II comment., in Opera Omnia S. Thomas, ed. Leonina, Vol. IV.

50. Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, In Aristoteles Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros Duos, (Lugduni: apud Ioannem Iacobi Iuntae F., 1579), In I Post. Anal., cap. 1, pp. 270, 274; cf. also In II Post. Anal., cap. 6, p. 582; ibid., cap. 7, pp. 593-94; In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Laurent, (Turin: Marietti, 1934), Prooemium, n. 8, p. 19.

51. Curs. Phil., I, p. 20.

52. Cf. above, n. 48.

53. S. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 1331-38.

54. In I De Anima, lect. 1, n. 15.

55. Cf. S. Thomas In II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ad 9; In II Physic., lect. 5, n. 7.

56. For these distinctions cf. S. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 17, n. 1658; In I de Anima, lect. 2; In I De Caelo, lect. 2, n. 2, in Opera Omnia, ed. Leonina, Vol. III. Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, In de Anima Aristoteles, ed. Coquelle, (2 vols.; Rome: Institutum Anglicum, 1938-1939), Vol. I, n. 73, p. 58.

57. Aristoteles, De Partibus Animalium, ed. Bekker, Lib. II, cap. 1, 646 a37 ff. S. Thomas, In II Physic., lect. 15, n. 6.

58. Cf. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 9, nn. 4-6.
59. Cf. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 190.
60. Cf. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 7, n. 6; ibid., lect. 8; In VII Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 1345, 1352, 1355.
Cajetanus, In de Ente et Essentia, cap. 7, nn. 155-56, pp. 247-51.

PART II:

1. S. Albertus, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 155.
2. The distinction of the quaestio simplex and the quaestio composita is fully elaborated by Cajetan in his commentary: In II Post. Anal., cap. 1, pp. 542-43.
3. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 1, p. 545.
4. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 156. Cajetan's observations apropos of this phrase will likewise be helpful: "Aristoteles . . . intellexit vere scitum idem quod investigatione certum, ut per ly 'certum' distinguatur ab opinato, et per ly 'investigatione' distinguatur a principiis a natura inditis, et sic claudit in se omnia dubitabilia quae possunt per certitudinem cognosci, sive per demonstrationem, sive non, et consequenter notitia ipsius quod quid est, etc." In II Post. Anal., cap. 1, p. 541. He points out that if the phrase vere scitum is interpreted per demonstrationem cognitum, it will have to include not only the conclusion but also the mean, the quod quid est, which is less properly known per demonstrationem.
5. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 1, p. 547.
6. Cajetan explains this at greater length: ". . . diffinitio licet formaliter non sit vera vel falsa, virtualiter tamen est vera. Secundo dicitur, quod licet quaestio quid quaerit formaliter de incomplexo, quaerit tamen id quod est ratio veritatis complexi, quoniam ipsum quid est medium ad concludendum an est, et propterea scibile et verum et enuntiabile appellatur. Scibilia siquidem non eadem ratione omnia dicuntur, sed alia ut conclusiones: et haec proprie sunt an est, et quia est, aliae ut causas conclusionum, et haec sunt quid, et propter quid. Quae quoniam in enuntiationibus posita veritatem formaliter sortiuntur, non immerito solam enuntiationem quaeribilem et scibilem esse dictum est." Ibid., pp. 547-48.
7. In this regard Cajetan has an interesting observation involving again the relation of the operations of mind in their actual exercise. "Licet enim ad scire quod quid est, praecedat scire quia talia praedicata sunt partes diffinitionis insunt diffinibili, tamen est hoc per accidens pro quanto primae operationi intellectus immiscetur secunda, . . ." Ibid., p. 547.
8. Cf. Cajetanus, ibid., pp. 546-47. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 160. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect., n. 2.

9. For an example of this cf. R. Owen; The Nature of Demonstrative Proof, (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1943), pp. 14-24.

10. In II Post. Anal., cap. 1, p. 549: "A praecognitionibus vero quaestiones differunt in duobus, et primo in hoc quod sub praecognitione quid concluditur quid nominis, sub quaestione vero quid minime, eo quod quid nominis non est pars scientiae, sed variationi et placito humano subiacet, necessario tamen praesupponi oportet quia a vocibus doctrina et disciplina sit. Secundo in hoc quod sub praecognitione quia concluditur veritas principiorum et esse simpliciter subiecti, quorum neutrum clauditur sub quaestione quia, sed veritas principiorum extra quaestiones omnino est, ut pote ex se evidens, et esse simpliciter subiecti clauditur sub quaestione an est."

11. The inquiry is not restricted to the conclusion of the demonstration. The question concerns any manner of knowing a thing through demonstration--as conclusion, as the passion, or any other way. The exact way in which this is possible will be determined only in chapters seven and eight. Cf. Cajetanus, ibid., cap. 2, p. 557: "quaestio quaerit . . . utrum sit idem secundum idem diffinitione et demonstratione scire, sive illud attingatur a demonstratione, ut conclusio, sive ut passio, sive quocunque alio modo. Et hic absque dubio est vere intentus sensus, quoniam quaestio ista non determinatur usque ad cap. 7. ubi dicetur quomodo idem secundum idem potest attingi a diffinitione et demonstratione, et quomodo non. The conclusions at which he will arrive disputative in the previous chapters will be true, each in its own particular sense.

12. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 2, p. 558: ". . . illa propositio, unius inquantum unum est, unica est scientia, est vera loquendo de scientia, quam res scibilis ex se exigit, seu generat, quoniam res sicut se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad cognosci quantum est ex se. Et propterea si res una est ut sic, unicuique exigit cognitionis suae modum, ex parte autem nostri non inconvenit plurificare modos cognoscendi unicam rem, et ideo loquendo de cognitionis modo ex parte nostris, propositio illa non est necessaria."

13. Cajetanus, ibid., cap. 6, p. 563: "Septem namque modos adduxit, quibus quod quid est imaginatur induci, scilicet per veram demonstrationem, per divisionem, per artem diffinitivam, per oppositum, per inductionem, per admixtionem cum si est, seu quia est, et per quid nominis, ut patet ex dictis; praeter hos animi modos non facile est octavum invenire. Ad veritatis ergo decisionem properandum est, etc."

14. In II Post. Anal., lect. 3, n. 2.

15. In II Post. Anal., cap. 3, pp. 560-61.

16. Cf. Cajetanus, In I Post. Anal., cap. 3, p. 301, and In II Post. Anal., cap. 3, p. 567.

17. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 3, p. 568: "quia tamen in tali processu assumitur quod quid est ipsius tertii et eius quod quid est principaliter quaeritur, ideo dixi quod petitur id quod principaliter et formaliter quaerit; petit siquidem, secundum veritatem in tali processu, quod quid est ipsius minoris extremi, non tamen illudmet quod concluditur; et quoniam nunc agitur de demonstratione quod quid est eo cuius est simpliciter, et non de demonstratione huius vel illius quod quid est, ideo peti dicitur quod principaliter et formaliter quaeritur, etc."

18. Cf. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 3. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., pp. 168-70. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 3, pp. 568-69.

19. Bk. I, chap. 28.

20. Sylvester Maurus, Commentarium in Aristotelis Opera Omnia, Tome I, (Paris: Lethiellieux, 1885), In II Post. Anal., cap. 4, n. 8.

21. Bk. X, chaps. 4 and 7.

22. In II Post. Anal., cap. 4, p. 574.

23. Sylvester Maurus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 4, n. 5.

24. In his commentary on this chapter St. Albert explains clearly what is meant by knowing the quia est before the quid est, and how they are not known at the same time (simul). ". . . 'quia' praecedit 'quid' secundum quod res est vere in suis principiis, quamvis non sit in actu vel in anima: et secundum hoc quia semper praecedit quid: et ex his aliquis venatur ex diffinitione inquirens ex quibus principiis et qualiter: . . . Dicendum quod quia est per medium accidentale potest haberi ant quid est, ut dictum est: sed si quia est probetur per medium essentiale, hoc non erit diffinitio, et ratio quia est et quid est simul scientur: et hoc expresse dicit Commentator. Et tunc cum scitur per medium essentiale, tunc etiam non simul aliquo modo: quia non aequae immediate sequitur utrumque ex demonstratione: quia non sequitur ex demonstratione tali immediate: et tunc cognoscendo si est per essentialia, percipitur et colligitur diffinitio ipsius." Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 181.

25. S. Albertus, ibid., p. 179.
26. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 6, p. 581.
27. Ibid., p. 582.
28. The latter part of chapter seven, beginning with "Si ergo definiens demonstrat . . ." is interpreted in different ways by various commentators. Their opinions are cited by the editors of the Leonine text in their footnotes, Vol. I, p. 348, n. 'd'. The explanations given by St. Albert and Cajetan were found particularly helpful. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., pp. 180-82. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 6, p. 579.
29. In II Post. Anal., lect. 6, n. 10.
30. For example, J.M. Le Blond treats the question only in terms of the logical syllogism of the essence. Cf. Logique et Méthode chez Aristote, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1939), pp. 156-68.
31. Cf. also S. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 26, n. 2.
32. S. Thomas, In III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 1, ad 8.
33. S. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 16, n. 5.
34. S. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
35. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 483.
36. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 7, p. 591.
37. Lib. VII, lect. 17, nn. 1657-58. Cf. also the Leonine text of S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., p. 352, n. 'z'.
38. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 190: "Et si dicitur quod formalis (diffinitio) subjecti logica est vana ad demonstrationem, dicendum quod vana est ad passionem demonstrandam, sed non ad demonstrandum diffinitionem materialem." Cf. also S. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 3, a. 1, ad 1.
39. Post. Anal., Lib. II, cap. 8, 93 a5.
40. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., pp. 182-84.
41. In II Post. Anal., lect. 7, n. 3.

42. This argument approaches the second explanation of the petitio in the third chapter of the second book of the Posterior Analytics.

43. Cf. above, p. 46.

44. In II Post. Anal., cap. 7, p. 591.

45. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 7, p. 592.

46. Ibid., p. 593.

47. Cf. Cajetanus, ibid., p. 596. The following passage also includes two examples of such knowledge: "Secundum accidens nihil aliud sonat, in proposito, quam secundum aliud: aliud autem hic dicitur, non solum extraneum accidens, sed passio propria: et non solum utrunque horum, sed etiam praedicatum substantiale commune, etc., unde ita sumitur accidens, sicut et sumitur in elenchis accidens, a quo dicitur fallacia accidentis, etc. Scire ergo quia est secundum accidens, est scire rem esse, non nisi quia induit aliquod aliud a se modo exposito: verbi gratia, scire intelligentias esse, quia motores orbium sunt, est scire quia secundum accidens, quoniam ex hoc non aliter sciuntur, quam ut habent rationem movendi: et similiter scire eas esse quia substantiae immateriales sunt, est scire eas esse secundum accidens, quoniam ex hoc nescimus tales res in species esse, sed in comuni, in eo quod immateriales sunt, etc. Scire autem vere, quia est, est cognoscere quod ipsum secundum proprium et essentialem conceptum sit, etc."

48. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 7, n. 7.

49. In II Post. Anal., cap. 7, p. 597.

50. Sylvester Maurus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 5, n. 7: "si fuerit inventa haec ratio et hoc medium, quod sit propria causa rei, tum per illud cognoscimus et demonstramus, et quod passio convenit subjecto, et propter quid convenit, et etiam possumus elicere, quid sit passio, quae convenit."

51. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 8, n. 8.

52. Aristotle's summary (93 b15-20) as given by St. Thomas in paragraph nine of the seventh lesson seems to apply only to the demonstrative method. The outline given by St. Thomas in paragraph four determines its position to be such. He likewise indicates that it is in elaborating this particular method that the objections of lesson six are answered, a point to which we shall again make reference. Sylvester Maurus, however, interprets this passage as a summary of both methods. Cf. Sylvester Maurus, In II Post., Anal., cap. 5, n. 8.

53. Post. Anal., Lib. II, cap. 8, 93 b20-28.

54. Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 187.

55. Ibid., p. 188.

56. Ibid., p. 189: ". . . si loquimur de potissima et principalissima demonstratione, illa est in qua demonstratur passio de subjecto per diffinitionem passionis, quae dicit et quid et propter quid, et in qua eadem ratione diffinitio passionis demonstratur quae dicit quid sicut demonstratur et ipsa passio."

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 190.

61. Cf. Aristoteles, Post. Anal., Lib. II, cap. 8, 93 b20.

62. Cf. S. Thomas In II Post. Anal., lect. 8, n. 4. The following part of the text is very difficult to interpret: "Et sicut illa quorum non est alia causa, ita etiam illa quae possunt habere medium, et quorum est altera causa, potest manifestari quod quid est: ita tamen quod non demonstratur ipsum quod quid est, sed magis medium demonstrationis ut quod quid est accipiatur." There seems to be some omission from the text. The passage as it stands apparently establishes a community between those things which have an altera causa and those which do not. Both quiddities would be manifested through demonstration, a factor which up to this point has served to distinguish them. Cajetan shows clearly that manifestation of the quod quid est through demonstration refers only to those things with an altera causa--passions. The exposition given by Dominicus a Flandria does not resolve this question. (Cf. Opera Omnia S. Thomas, ed. Leonina, Vol. I, p. 357, n. '2') The simple use of a quiddity as medium does not universally warrant the expression, manifestation through demonstration. His exposition appeals again to the logical syllogism of the essence.

63. ". . . quia in omnibus generibus causarum debet perveniri ad primas causas; ergo etiam in genere quidditatum; ergo dantur quaedam quidditates, quarum in tali genere non est altera causa; ergo tales quidditates non cognoscuntur per demonstrationem, sed accipiuntur et supponuntur ut prima principia demonstrationum." Sylvester Maurus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 5, n. 9.

64. Cajetan, In II Post. Anal., cap. 7, p. 600.

65. Ibid.

66. Cf. Cajetan, ibid., pp. 597 f. S. Albertus, Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 184.

67. In II Post. Anal., lect. 8, n. 9.

68. Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 190.

69. The broader interpretation in question is the one given above according to the four genera of causes.

70. The following are some of the more important references in the works of St. Thomas to the definition as a demonstratio positionis differentis:

In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

In IV Sent., dist. 3, a. 1, q. 1, 1, corp; ibid., 3 corp., and also ad 4.

In I Physic. lect. 1, n. 5.

In I Post. Anal., lect. 16, nn. 4-5; ibid., lect. 26, n. 3.

In II De Anima, lect. 1, n. 212; ibid., lect. 3, n. 247.

71. Lib. II, lect. 19, n. 4.

72. Lib. I, lect. 2, n. 3.

73. Lib. II, lect. 1, n. 9; cf. also Lib. II, lect. 7, n. 8: ". . . ipsum medium ostendens propter quid, est ratio definitiva primi termini, idest maioris extremitatis. (Sed si oporteat accipere aliquod aliud medium ad hoc demonstrandum, hoc assumetur ex reliquis rationibus, id est ex definitione minoris extremitatis, et aliarum causarum extrinsecarum.) Cum enim subiectum sit causa passionis, necesse est quod definitio passionis demonstretur per definitionem subiecti."

74. Cajetan, In II Post. Anal., cap. 7, p. 607.

75. Ibid., p. 608. For a discussion of whether this definition is a definition quid rei or quid nominis of the passion confer Cajetan, In I Post. Anal., cap. 1, pp. 274-75.

76. Opera Omnia, Vol. II, In II Post. Anal., p. 190-93.

77. Ibid., p. 191.

78. The specific difference as well as the genus can be called an essential or quidditative predicate inasmuch as it is an intrinsic part of the quod quid est. The genus, however, is

strictly predicated in quid, whereas the difference is predicated only in quale quid. Cf. Joan. & S. Thomas, Curs. Phil., I, p. 387. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 10, p. 642-43.

79. Cf. S. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 12; In VIII Metaph., lect. 2, n. 1696.

80. Cf. S. Thomas, Ia, q. 18, a. 2, corp.; ibid., q. 13, a. 8, ad 2; In II Sent., dist. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. I.

81. S. Thomas, In VIII Metaph., lect. 2. Cf. also Joan. & S. Thomas, Curs. Phil., I, p. 465, col. 1, ll. 1-10.

82. S. Thomas, Ia, q. 87, a. 1 and 2.

83. In II Post. Anal., lect. 13, n. 7.

84. In I De Anima, lect. 1, n. 15. The following texts are likewise of interest: S. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, a. 6, corp; ibid., dist. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; In VII Metaph., lect. 12, n. 1552; Q.D. De Anima, a. 12, ad 8. While the texts given below enunciate the same principle as the previous ones, the references in them to definition by proper accidents must be interpreted in the light of what was said above; S. Thomas, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, ad 3; Q. D. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 11, ad 3, also ad 14. S. Albertus, Vol. I, De Praedicabilibus, p. 12, col. 2, ll. 29-35; ibid., p. 14, col. 1, ll. 35-46; Vol. II, II Post. Anal., p. 166, col. 1, ll. 5-17.

85. Cf. S. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 14, nn. 2-3. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 10, p. 640. Sylvester Maurus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 8, nn. 4-6.

86. Aristoteles, Post. Anal., Lib. II, cap. 12, 96 b15: "Congruum autem est cum totum aliquod aliquis negotietur, departiri genus in atoma specie prima . . ."

87. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 10, p. 656.

88. Cf. Aristoteles, Peri., cap. 10, 20 b1.

89. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 10, p. 642: ". . . opposita esse immediata, seu quibus nihil interest, est intelligendum non solum de immediatione inter se, sed etiam de immediatione inter ipsa et divisum: oportet siquidem opposita in quae fit divisio, et esse immediata inter se, ita quod nihil inter ea cadat medium: aliter divisum non necessario evacuetur per talia opposita, ut patet in divisione coloris per album et nigrum."

90. S. Thomas, In X Metaph., lect. 9, n. 2108-10.

91. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 450. Cf. also, S. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 12, in connection with which this point will be further developed. The objection that all differentiae must be opposed as contraries is answered in the following passage from the Q.D. De Anima, of St. Thomas, a. 7, ad 18: "Dicendum quod naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias; nam materia, super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariarum formarum. Secundum autem considerationem logicam, sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis; sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similiter est in spiritualibus substantiis." Thus for the purpose of definition an opposition of strict contrariety in the differentiae is not necessary in all cases.

92. Cf. S. Thomas, In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristoteles Expositio, ed. Piretta, (Turin: Marietti, 1934), In II Ethic., lect. 5, n. 289.

93. S. Thomas, In III Physic., lect. 1, n. 5.

94. Aristoteles, Physica, Lib. I, cap. 1. S. Thomas, In I Metaph., lect. 2, n. 45.

95. Cajetanus, In II Post. Anal., cap. 10, p. 643.

96. Ibid., p. 644.

97. Post. Anal., Lib. II, cap. 12, 97 b15-25.

98. In I de Anima, Prooemium, n. 9.

99. In II Post. Anal., cap. 10, p. 646.

PART III:

1. Cf. S. Thomas, In VI Metaph., lect. 1, n. 1156.

2. "... Et hujusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subjectum logicae. Hujusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus equiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subjectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit quod subjectum logicae equiparatur subjecto philosophiae, quod est ens naturae . . ." S. Thomas, In IV Metaph., lect. 4, n. 574. Cf. also Aristoteles, Metaphysica, Lib. VII, cap. 4, 1029 b13. S. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 20; In VII Metaph., lect. 3, n. 1308; Opuscula Omnia S. Thomas, ed. Mandonnet, (5 vols.; Paris: Lethielleux, 1927) III, In Boetium De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1.

3. Cf. S. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 3, nn. 1308, 1315, 1316; In VIII Metaph., lect. 1, nn. 1681, 1685.

4. Chaps. 10 and 11.

5. Chap. 12.

6. Chaps. 13 - 16.

7. In VII Metaph., lect. 17, n. 1648.

8. In VIII Metaph., lect. 1, n. 1681.

9. Ibid., n. 1686.

10. "Est autem definitio oratio, quae significat quid res sit." Aristoteles, Topica, Lib. I, cap. 5, 101 b38. St. Thomas likewise refers to the definition in similar terms. Besides the numerous texts in his commentary on the Metaphysics, cf. In I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; Contra Gentes, Lib. II, cap. 93.

11. As St. Thomas explains: "Et quod id quod quid erat esse, non sit nisi ejus quod est aliquid, ex hoc patet: quod quidem quid erat esse, est quod aliquid erat esse. Esse enim quid, significat esse aliquid. Unde illa quae non significant aliquid, non habent quod quid erat esse. Sed quando aliquid de aliquo dicitur, ut accidens de subjecto, non est hoc aliquid: sicut cum dico, homo est albus, non significatur quod sit hoc aliquid, sed quod sit quale. Esse enim hoc aliquid convenit solis substantiis. Et ita patet, quod album et similia non possunt habere quod quid erat esse." In VII Metaph., lect. 3, n. 1323.

12. "In his autem in quibus aliquid est perfectissimum, nomen commune generis appropriatur his quae deficiunt a perfectissimo, ipsi autem perfectissimo adaptatur aliud speciale nomen, ut patet in logicis. Nam in genere convertibilium illud quod significat quod quid est, speciali nomine definitio vocatur; quae autem ab hoc deficiunt convertibilia existentia nomen commune sibi retinent, scilicet quod propria dicuntur." S. Thomas, IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 2, corp.

13. Cf. Joannes a Sto Thomas, Curs. Phil., I (Reiser), p. 371: "ratio autem huius non est difficilis, quia illud constitutum ex accidente et subiecto constat ex rebus diversorum praedicamentorum, scilicet substantia et accidente. Haec autem non possunt convenire in unam quidditatem et definitionem, quia definitio et quidditas constant ex genere et differentia. Ubi autem sunt plura praedicamenta, sunt plura genera; praedicamentum enim est series generum et specierum et diversa praedicamenta diversa genera et differentias habent et consequenter diversas species seu quidditates. Ergo ex rebus diversorum praedicamentorum non componitur una quidditas et unum definibile constans ex uno genere et differentia; ergo est per accidens."

14. In VII Metaph., lect. 4, n. 1334.

15. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 7, (ed. Laurent) n. 135, p. 218: ". . . quaecumque diffiniuntur necessario per aliquod quod est extra eorum essentiam, habent diffinitionem incompletam, diffinitio enim talium non completur per intrinseca sed eget extrinseco additamento; sed accidentia diffiniuntur necessario per aliquod, quod est extra eorum essentiam, oportet siquidem in eorum diffinitione poni subiectum, ut dicitur VII Metaph.: ergo accidentia habent diffinitionem incompletam."

16. Cf. S. Thomas, In II Sent., disp. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 374.

17. Cf. S. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 1339-41; also De Ver., q. 16, a. 1, ad 8: "Homo albus non potest definiri definitione propria, qualis est definitio substantiarum quae significant unum per se; sed potest definiri definitione quadam secundum quid, in quantum ex subiecto et accidente fit unum secundum quid; et talis unitas sufficit ad hoc quod unum nomen possit imponi."

18. Cf. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 7, n. 152, pp. 241-44, where the author discusses in what way this statement must be understood in order to be true. In general,

every accident has a proper subject in the sense of a subject which bespeaks a basic aptitude to receive and sustain that accident and not in the sense of a subject which is always in act with respect to the accident.

19. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thomas, Curs. Phil., I, p. 397.

20. "Accidens dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo subjectum non ponitur in definitione accidentium ut genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur, Simitas est curvitas nasi. Alio modo possunt accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum subjecto; unde sic non assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subjectum ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus." S. Thomas, De Ver., q. 3, a. 7, ad 2.

"... concreta accidentium non definiuntur quidditative nisi ratione sui formalis, cui essentialia sunt praedicata, quae in definitione ponuntur. Concretum autem ut conflatum ex subiecto et accidente solum definitur definitione quid nominis, ut cum dico: 'Album est habens albedinem'." Joan. a Sto Thomas, Curs. Phil., I, p. 502. Cf. also ibid., I, p. 397 b40 - 398 a20.

In commenting on the Posterior Analytics, Cajetan explains very well how the difference in the mode of signification can affect the manner of defining. Only the definition of the accident as signified in abstracto is a definition of an accident secundum exigentiam suae naturae simpliciter. In the definition of the accident in concreto, the subject is placed in the definition in recto, whereas the subject, since it is something extra essentialiam, should strictly speaking be placed ut additum in the definition, i.e., in obliquo. In I Post. Anal., cap. 4, p. 312.

21. Curs. Phil., I, p. 375. Cf. also ibid., I, p. 102.

22. In V Metaph., lect. 22, nn. 1121-27. Cf. also S. Thomas, In I Peri., lect. 4, n. 5.

23. Cf. S. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 9, n. 1477. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 7, n. 135, p. 218; cap. 2, n. 24, p. 43. S. Thomas In II De Anima, lect. 1, n. 213. We should note at this point that a form can be defined in relation to a subjectum formatum or a subjectum informatum. When the soul is defined as the act of an organic body, the latter is as a subjectum formatum. Cf. S. Thomas, Q.D. De Anima, a. 1, ad 15.

24. Cf. S. Thomas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. 1; In V Metaph., lect. 10. The unity of this nature as considered absolutely in itself which is the basis of the unity of the definition is described as a negative formal unity. It is a unity "quantum ad negationem divisionis per principia formalia." Positive unity comes to the nature only as it exists in the individual or in the intellect. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thomas, Curs. Phil., I, p. 323, p. 331. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 4, n. 61, p. 94.

25. Cf. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3, n. 40, p. 61.

26. S. Thomas, In I Sent., disp. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. Cf. also S. Thomas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3, and Cajetanus in loco, (ed. Laurent), nn. 41-43, pp. 63-65. St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 12, n. 1548.

27. "Pro intellectu horum nota quod significatum formale nominis ad praesens est perfectio seu forma determinate et primo explicata per illud nomen. Materiale vero est id quod sub nominis significatione cadit non primo." Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3, n. 45, p. 67.

28. S. Thomas, In III Metaph., lect. 8, n. 435: "Similiter etiam nec genus per se sumptum, potest praedicari de differentia praedicatione per se. Non enim genus ponitur in definitione differentiae, quia differentia non participat genus, ut dicitur in quarto Topicorum. Nec etiam differentia ponitur in definitione generis: ergo nullo modo per se genus praedicatur de differentia." Cf. also Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3, n. 45, p. 66.

29. In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3, n. 46, p. 69.

30. Ibid., p. 70.

31. Thus Cajetan can say: "Homo ergo secundum suum formalem intellectum seu conceptum acceptus non est animal neque rationale, sed ex animali et rationali. Et sicut dictum est de homine, qui est species, ita dicite de animali quod est definitio: animal enim rationale secundum suum formalem conceptum, non est animal neque rationale sed ex animali et rationali: differt namque formalis conceptus animalis rationalis a conceptu formali animalis et a conceptu rationalis sicut totum a partibus."

32. S. Thomas, In Boetium De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, p. 63: "Aliquid igitur invenitur commune in utraque similitudine, quod in una subternitur imperfectioni, et in alia perfectioni,

sicut materia substernitur actui et privationi, et ideo materia simul accepta cum hoc communi, est adhuc materialis respectu perfectionis, et imperfectionis praedictae, et ex hoc materiali sumitur genus, differentia vero ex perfectione et imperfectione praedicta. Sicut ex hoc communi materiali, quod est habere vitam, sumitur hoc genus quod est animatum corpus: ex perfectione vero superaddita, haec differentia, sensibile; ex imperfectione vero, haec differentia insensibile; et sic diversitas talium materialium inducit diversitatem generis, sicut animalis a planta. Et propter hoc dicitur materia esse principium diversitatis secundum genus. . ."

53. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 402. S. Thomas, C.E. De Spirit. Creat., a. 1, ad 24.

34. Joan. a Sto. Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 389: "Genus est universale respiciens (vel aptum respicere, si fundamentaliter tradatur) plura specie distincta in quid."

55. S. Thomas, In De Trin., q. 4, a. 2: "Sciendum tamen quod cum illud materiale, unde sumitur genus, habeat in se formam et materiam, logicus considerat genus solum ex parte ejus quod formale est, unde ejus definitiones dicuntur formales, sed naturalis considerat genus ex parte utriusque. Et ideo contingit quandoque quod aliquid communicat in genere secundum logicum, quod non communicat secundum naturalem. Contingit enim quandoque quod illud de similitudine primi actus quod consequitur res aliqua in materia tali, aliud consequitur sine materia, aliud in alia materia omnino diversa. Sicut patet quod lapis in materia quae est secundum potentiam ad esse, pertingit ad hoc quod subsistat, ad quod idem pertingit sol secundum materiam, quae est in potentia ad ubi, et non ad esse, et angelus omni materia carens. Unde logicus inveniens in his omnibus illud ex quo genus sumebat, ponit omnia haec in uno genere substantiae. Naturalis vero et metaphysicus qui considerant principia rerum, omnia non inveniunt convenientia in materia, dicunt ea differre genere, secundum hoc quod dicitur X Metaphys., quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt genere, quorum est materia una et generatio ad invicem."

Ibid., q. 6, a. 3: "Logicus enim considerat absolute intentiones, secundum quas nihil prohibet convenire immaterialia materialibus, et incorruptibilia corruptibilibus. Sed naturalis et philosophus primus considerant essentias, secundum quod habent esse in rebus, et ideo ubi inveniunt diversum modum potentiae et actus et per hoc diversum modum essendi, dicunt esse diversa genera."

S. Thomas, In X Metaph., lect. 12, n. 2142: "Genus autem, physice loquendo, a materia sumitur. Unde supra dictum est, quod ea quae non communicant in materia, sunt genere diversa. Logice autem loquendo, nihil prohibet quod convenient in genere, inquantum convenient in una communi ratione, vel substantiae, vel qualitatis, vel alicujus hujusmodi."

36. Q.D. De Anima, a. 7, ad 18; In X Metaph., lect. 10, nn. 2120-23; In V Metaph., lect. 22, nn. 1121-23. Where one of the differences is a privative term (e.g., irrational) it departs necessarily from the perfection of a true difference as defined by Cajetan from Aristotle: ". . . verae differentiae appellantur differentiae positivae non extraneae contrariae inter se convertibiles cum his quorum sunt differentiae." Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 6, n. 133, p. 215.
37. In Boet. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2; Q.D. De Anima, a. 7, ad 17.
38. Q.D. De Anima, a. 7, ad 16; De Ente et Essentia, cap. 6; In VIII Metaph., lect. 3, n. 1720; In II Sent., disp. 3, q. 1, a. 5; Opusculum De Natura Generis, cap. 5, (Opuscula Omnia, ed. Mandonnet), Vol. 5, p. 229: "Illae ergo substantiae simplices nullum genus subalternum habent: et ideo unica differentia sufficit earum perfectioni, quia non colligitur earum perfectio ex multis et diversis divisionibus generum et conjunctionibus differentiarum: et tanto perfectior est earum natura, quanto plura unita et in uno simplici habet."
39. Cf. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, q. 6, n. 131, pp. 209-11.
40. Ibid., n. 133, p. 215: "Cum enim intelligentiae careant genere subalterno, ut S. Thomas in tractatu de natura generis testatur, eo quod perfectio earum ex pluribus conjunctionibus differentiarum non consurgit, sicut perfectio specierum in istis inferioribus, quibus non sufficit genus commune et differentia, omnes immediate sub uno genere continebuntur; et sic genus earum, si veris differentiis ad illas descendere debet, oportet multimembrem fieri divisionem nobis ignotam: quod si bipartita divisione contrahendum erit, alteram simpliciter necesse est esse non veram, quia privativam; alteram propter debilitatem intellectus nostri ad nullam propriam earum differentiam ascendere potentis, necesse quoque est esse non veram."
41. Cf. S. Thomas, Q.D. De Anima, a. 7, corp. and ad 17; Quaest. Quodlib., I, a. 6; ibid., IX, a. 6, ad 3.
42. Cf. also Aristoteles, Metaphysica, Lib. V, cap. 24-27.
43. Cf. S. Thomas In VII Metaph., lect. 12, nn. 1537-44.
44. Ibid., n. 1549.
45. Ibid., nn. 1556-58. Cajetan explains in what sense there is not a nugatio when the superior parts constituting the difference of man as an essential whole are given: ". . . quia in

diffinitione oportet explicite ponere superiora omnia usque ad ultimam differentiam, et tamen posteriorem implicite quodammodo claudere priorem (ut patet, cum dicitur, animal est substantia animata sensibilis) ideo in diffinitione universalis explicavit de omni, et per se. Nec ob hoc sequitur nugatio, quia ad negationem non sufficit qualiscunque inclusio unius in altero, sed exigitur, quod unum includatur formaliter, et intrinsece in conceptu formali alterius. Unde dicere animal rationale non est, nugatio, quia animal ut additum in conceptu rationalis cadit et similiter dicere nasus simus et similia." In I Post. Anal., cap. 5, p. 326.

46. Cf. S. Thomas, In VIII Metaph., lect. 5; In I Peri., lect. 8, nn. 10-11.

47. Cf. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 6, n. 131, pp. 212-13.

48. Ibid., p. 213. Cf. also Joen. a Sto Thomas, Curs. Phil., I, p. 503.

49. Cf. S. Thomas, In VIII Metaph., lect. 5, n. 1763. Cajetanus, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. 4, n. 56, pp. 85-90.

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